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Abstract
This chapter will outline guidelines developed to both support and enhance innovation 
within the context of procuring complex performance (PCP) contracts. Such contracts 
are currently being employed across a range of sectors where limited market condi‐
tions exist. Such contracts and market conditions are set to remain the dominant form of 
defence procurement strategy for the foreseeable future. The case of the Typhoon combat 
aircraft programme is presented as an example of a typical, large‐scale, complex procure‐
ment programme for the defence industry. The MoD and the UK defence industry have 
developed new, contractual models for procuring complex equipment, such as aircraft 
and naval ships. These models involve the contracting for complex performance, which 
has changed the paradigm in the relationship between the customer(s) (MoD, UK Armed 
Forces) and the supplier (UK Defence Industry). Outcome‐based contracts for procur‐
ing complex performance (PCP) have been employed widely by the defence industry 
and other sectors in limited or oligopolistic markets. Ten theoretical propositions are 
presented in this chapter, to help us discuss PCP contracts. The literature review will 
include servitisation, complex performance models and discuss innovation strategies in 
the context of limited markets. Lessons learnt from the case, and guidelines for enhancing 
innovation are presented.
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1. Introduction
With the national defence budgets reducing over time as a result of environmental changes 
and continued economic uncertainty [1], the MOD and the UK defence industry have devel‐
oped new, contractual models for procuring complex, technology‐driven equipment, such 
as aircraft and ships. These models involve contracting for complex performance, which has 
changed the paradigm in the relationship between the customer(s) (MOD, UK Armed Forces) 
and the supplier (UK defence industry).
In procuring complex performance (PCP) contracts, a close, long‐term relationship is devel‐
oped that requires all those involved in the value‐chain, including the customer and the exten‐
sive supply network, to co‐operate in an enterprise approach to deliver competitive advantage 
with no single actor having the internal capability to achieve the totality of the requirement. 
Incentivising the supplier is key to delivering innovation, both radical and incremental, which 
requires suitable mechanisms built into the contractual and organisational construct. However, 
it is suggested that innovation within the defence industry may now be inhibited by the way that 
these new business and operating models have been implemented [2]. Innovation is a widely 
explored subject but, currently, no guidelines exist for supporting innovation in PCP contracts 
for organisations engaged in this type of procurement activity. Therefore, this chapter seeks 
to identify from the literature a set of trends, success factors and barriers to support and enhance 
innovation within the context of a PCP contract. Each of these will be reviewed in the context of the 
UK Typhoon combat aircraft programme, a major project in the UK Defence industry in order 
to move towards a set of guidelines that may be of interest to a practicing manager who has 
responsibility for managing a PCP project. This topic is relevant and of significance as PCP con‐
tracts are being employed across a range of sectors where limited market conditions exist and 
are set to remain the dominant form of defence procurement strategy for the foreseeable future.
Innovation is a feature of all successful enterprises and essential to provide future growth 
while remaining competitive and adaptable in a dynamic world [3] but setting the right con‐
ditions for enabling innovation within companies and organisations is not simple. A taut 
definition is provided by Tidd and Bessant [4] is ‘the successful exploitation of new ideas’ (p. 19) 
inferring that innovation is a process whereby new ideas are converted into value either mon‐
etary or otherwise. Innovation involves integrating technological, market and organisational 
change. Being innovative is vital to the UK defence industry to ensure that it can meet the 
MOD's, and, ultimately, the Nation's requirements for continual adaptation of capabilities to 
meet the challenges of the future which was reinforced by the Secretary of State for Defence 
[5] in the 2015 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR):
’Given those challenges, my third and final point is that being efficient would not be enough. We also 
need to innovate. We are determined to take the opportunity offered by the SDSR to build a culture more 
ready to take risks and more open to change. We want to do everything we can to augment our force 
structure, speed up the integration of new technologies, adopt new operating concepts and incentivise 
modern working practices’.
The trend towards ‘performance‐based contracting’, such as ‘power‐by‐the‐hour’ in aviation, ‘con‐
tracting for availability’ (CFA) in defence for air, land and maritime forces and performance‐based 
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contracts in public‐private healthcare is reshaping service support networks in many capital‐inten‐
sive industries and is part of the wider movement towards integrated ‘servitisation’ models [6]. 
Performance‐based contracting is designed to replace the traditionally employed fixed‐price and 
cost‐plus contracts to improve product availability and reduce the cost of ownership by directly 
linking a supplier’s compensation to the output value of the product generated by the customer. 
Key features of PCP contracts are the shift in emphasis from output to outcome and the transfer of 
risk from the customer to the supplier for additional revenue [7, 8]. PCP contracts are an example 
of servitisation as an innovation strategy.
Drucker [9] suggests that innovation is the ‘discipline of the entrepreneur’ and the systematic 
search for ‘windows of opportunity’, which suggests that innovation is a process that can be 
learned, managed and influenced and reinforces, Myers and Marquis's [10] conceptualisation 
of innovation as a non‐linear, integrative process. The major choices a company make to influ‐
ence performance through innovation are defined as innovation strategy [11]. Examining and 
critically comparing the innovation strategies of the defence companies and agencies involved 
in the Typhoon combat aircraft programme, which has been procured using the PCP model, 
will enable an analysis of the challenges of innovation in limited markets and an opportunity 
to explore how innovation can be enhanced to deliver more value within the context of PCP 
contracts in the future. The intention is to build on current theory to understand the level of 
influence that contracting for complex performance has had on the innovation strategies of 
UK defence companies. These are categorised into trends, success factors and barriers to innova-
tion that influence innovation in complex performance contracts.
To highlight these issues in practice, the case of the Typhoon Combat Aircraft is presented that is 
representative of a typical, large‐scale, complex procurement programme for the defence indus‐
try. This programme is international, multi‐mission, combat aircraft designed and manufactured 
by companies from four European nations. In this case, we shall draw on fourteen interviews 
with personnel from three UK defence companies at different levels (e.g. strategic, operational 
and commercial) and the MoD involved in contracting for complex performance. A number of 
lessons learnt are drawn on from considering each of the trends, success factors and barriers to inno-
vation in the single case. It is intended that this moves us towards a set of guidelines that will be of 
interest for private firms and public agencies to enhance innovation capability within the context 
of programmes that have been procured using the contracting for complex performance model. 
Further work is suggested to provide a multi‐case analysis to enable a critical comparison of the 
approaches taken and are representative of the agencies that undertake this type of activity.
2. Research issues in contracting for complex performance
The literature review is bounded within the areas of innovation strategy and management 
within the context of contracting for complex performance in limited markets. First, innova‐
tion strategies within limited markets are discussed (Section 2.1), followed by introducing the 
strategy of servitisation (Section 2.2), concepts and principles in contracting for complex perfor‐
mance (Section 2.3), knowledge management and incentivisation in PCP contracts (Section 2.4) 
and reviewing timeframe, managing risk and the design of PCP contracts (Section 2.5).
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2.1. Innovation strategy within limited markets
Innovation has many facets, but Tidd and Bessant's [4] definition: ‘the successful exploitation 
of new ideas’ provides a holistic interpretation and introduces the concept of innovation as a 
process. The process view of innovation is widely supported [10–13] with process complex‐
ity increasing as concepts have developed from relatively simple, linear process models to 
the integrative and networked fifth generation models of innovation suggested by Rothwell 
[14]. The concept of open innovation introduced by Chesbrough [15] suggests that innovation 
activity and knowledge accumulation can take place beyond the boundaries of the firm. To 
be successful at innovating, firms or organisations should develop routines, which encourage 
knowledge sharing and absorptive capacity together with a culture that supports innovation 
and a climate that encourages creativity [16, 17].
Knowledge creation is an essential part of successful innovation practice, which involves 
creating and sharing knowledge throughout the organisation which can then be embodied 
in new technology or products [18]. Smith and Reinertsen [19] build on this idea, identify‐
ing that resources and organisational capabilities are the ingredients of successful innovation 
with repeatable, codified innovation routines being the fundamental building blocks of an 
innovative company. Building capabilities can be achieved through organisational learning by 
various methods including working closely with customers and suppliers, joint ventures and 
alliances. Pursuing incremental innovation is a strategy for many firms but Strecker [11] asserts 
that focusing purely on incremental innovation can harm firm performance in the long‐term 
and does not prepare a firm for discontinuous or radical innovation where the ‘rules of the 
game’ may change. Radical innovation can lead to a greater return on investment as well as 
superior competitive advantage [20]; however, radical innovation is inherently risky and does 
not always lead to success for pioneers of new products [4, 21]. Henderson and Clark [22] sug‐
gest that firms, which have an incremental or radical orientation, will require quite different 
organisational capabilities. Therefore, a tension exists in configuring for incremental or radical 
innovation. Many firms or organisations would still potentially seek to achieve both attributes.
In limited markets, like the defence or the rail industry, this tension will be particularly 
acute due to the characteristics of specialised markets with limited buyers and sellers. 
Limited or restricted market structures dominated by a few sellers are defined as an oli‐
gopoly. The theory of an open market structure suggests where competition between sellers 
is not restricted, this should generate low prices and high productivity whereas oligopolis‐
tic power can lead to imperfect outcomes and behaviours which can generate high prices 
and low productivity [2, 23, 24]. Imperfect markets are a challenge; further to this gov‐
ernments have pursued greater efficiency and effectiveness demanding greater innovation 
from industry, this has, in part, initiated adoption of strategies like ‘servitisation’ and the 
shift to new operating models, like PCP contracts. In the context of a PCP contract within a 
limited market structure, Caldwell and Howard (2014) indicate that firms will particularly 
struggle to configure to address the challenges of continual incremental innovation whilst 
also seeking to provide a radical innovation capability.
The extension of new concepts, like servitisation, through various sectors is indicative of more 
open forms of innovation. With the spread of technologies and methodologies across sectors 
Case Study of Innovative Projects - Successful Real Cases174
due to the effects of globalisation, particularly the rapid development of information tech‐
nologies, the influence of technology on the changes to institutions and vice versa is clear. 
Spin‐offs or concepts of ‘dual use’ across sectors of technology and methodologies are com‐
monplace [25]. It can be argued that national, sectoral and technological innovation systems 
play a part in driving change. National innovation systems are assessed as the totality of insti‐
tutions and practices that interact to produce and diffuse new technology whereas sectoral 
and technological innovation systems are concerned with adoption of certain technologies 
in or across sectoral boundaries [26]. It is suggested that it is the co‐evolution of national, 
sectoral and technological systems that has shaped specialised industries, like defence, and 
that innovation is driven or stifled by the interactions, inter‐linking processes and changes in 
technology and institutions [27–29].
2.2. Servitisation strategies in the context of defence projects
As industries evolve, new strategies like servitisation are developed. Baines et al., [30] 
define the concept of ‘servitisation’ as the innovation of an organisation's capabilities and 
processes to shift from selling products to selling integrated products and services that 
deliver value‐in‐use with manufacturers becoming ‘service‐manufacturers’. Servitisation 
has become a key source of growth for many industries, including defence, with integrated 
solutions being developed, which generate greater customer value. Long‐term relationships 
are emphasised with a shift towards organisational innovations, such as PCP contracts, to 
create new opportunities and gain a competitive advantage. In the context of servitisation, 
Gallego et al., [31] suggest that innovation needs to be progressively understood as an open 
and interactive process, which requires efforts, capabilities, and competences from vari‐
ous sources. This fits with Chesbrough's [15] concept of open innovation where incoming 
information and knowledge from outside the firm's boundaries is useful to the innovation 
processes.
New models of operation, such as servitisation, have challenged the traditional hierarchi‐
cal architecture among the state, firms as systems integrators and subcontractors within the 
industry and the management of complex programmes. With knowledge and capabilities 
becoming more widely distributed, the design and development of complex programmes 
require new interactions between the public and private sector, which implies new knowl‐
edge combinations and capabilities between these parties. To integrate and manage the 
system effectively will require architectural knowledge as well as technological and organ‐
isational competence [29, 32, 33]. To be effective systems, integrators will require that current 
processes and functions are re‐evaluated to develop new forms of exchange between the cus‐
tomer’s, the firm’s and, most likely, the array of sub‐contractors’ processes, behaviours and 
systems. Success in this area requires a true understanding of the meaning of value as it can be 
argued that a constant focus on ‘value‐for‐money’ by the state could undermine UK industrial 
capabilities. Many authors such as James [27] have argued that the creation of value should 
be a co‐creation activity. The instigation of organisational routines and processes that support 
learning will enable designers, integrators and suppliers of complex product systems to build 
capabilities based on previous activity which, in turn, may develop ‘repeatable solutions’ or 
enhanced solutions based on experience [2].
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In limited markets, like the defence industry, a close relationship between customers and 
suppliers is inevitable. As there are clear dependencies then a relationship between the 
organisations built on trust, vision, effective communication, collaboration and teamwork is 
an enabler for success [34–37]. To provide effective support and enable joint innovation, the 
firm requires intimate knowledge of the customer's operations. However, close co‐operation 
between suppliers also requires appropriate protection of intellectual property (IP) to encour‐
age and sustain innovation [38, 39].
By developing customised solutions for the customer alongside the physical product, the firm 
can reduce the overall costs associated with owning and using the product [40]. With a ser‐
vice‐based approach, a firm can improve its capability to deliver higher value which has been 
regarded as a strategy of innovation for firms to remain commercially competitive [41, 42]. 
Focusing on benefits and value in totality by not separating products from service, firms will 
be able to innovate for better outcomes in product design or enable better human processes. 
Vargo and Lusch [43] propose service as ‘the application of specialised competences (knowl‐
edge and skills) through deeds, processes, and performances for the benefit of another entity 
or the entity itself’ (p. 2). Success in the development of services will be largely determined by 
the innovation culture, which should encourage and support openness, creativity and going 
outside of the norm [44].
Transforming a firm towards being service‐orientated from a production‐orientated entity 
requires an innovative, integrative approach, which combines traditionally separate aspects 
of a firm. Areas such as manufacturing, engineering, operations, marketing, business man‐
agement, strategy and HR will have to work in an integrated fashion to co‐create value with 
the customer to deliver an effective and efficient service [45]. Service development process, 
organisation and culture are all elements of a new service‐orientated structure combined with 
measurement and rewards, suggested by Neu and Brown [46] as the five factors that enable 
successful service development. A service‐based structure would have a customer‐orientated, 
value‐in‐use based approach focused on outcomes provided by products or actions [47].
2.3. Contracting for complex performance
PCP contracts are a manifestation of the servitisation approach, which emphasise perfor‐
mance outcomes rather than how the outcome is to be achieved. Contracting for complex 
performance requires the service performance to be defined and linked to payment with an 
implicit transfer of risk to the supplier. Service performance is tied to financial penalties for 
poor performance and incentives for exceeding performance or innovating. PCP contracts are 
designed to be ‘through‐life’ solutions to complex projects providing sustainable support, 
maintenance and upgrade over extended periods, often decades.
PCP contracting is ‘outcome’ focused. Customers only pay when outcomes have been deliv‐
ered rather than for completed activities and tasks. This holds implications to the established 
architecture of ‘production’ and ‘manufacturing’ driving firms to be more innovative in the 
co‐creation of service value, such as reducing costs, implementing new customer‐focused pro‐
cesses and re‐engineering of business processes [48]. A focus on customer outcomes means 
that PCP contracts encourage collaboration and co‐ordination along the supply chain through 
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the alignment of incentives [39, 49, 50]. In turn, it is suggested that this combination supports 
innovation in the long term as suppliers may have an interest to invest in designing more reli‐
able products, with more efficient repair and logistics capabilities to increase profitability [51]. 
Through an examination of organisational control in terms of agency theory and socialisation 
models, Johnson and Medcof [52] demonstrated that PCP contracts support long‐term, proac‐
tive innovation. PCP contracts, vis‐à‐vis behaviour‐based contracts, engender self‐initiated 
agent innovation as outcomes are specified but not the means to achieve the objectives of the 
contract leaving space for innovation. The incentives for achieving the outcome with fewer 
resources are increased profits through the reward scheme built into the contract. It is argued 
that the literature currently underplays the challenges associated with supplier‐led innova‐
tion in product, process and working methods and that the empirical evidence is limited 
[53, 54, 79]. However, there is a generally accepted view that PCP [54] contracts do engender 
incremental innovation by the supplier [2, 8].
2.4. Knowledge management and incentivation in PCP contracts
Innovation, to a large extent, derives from the knowledge exchange between organisa‐
tions [56, 57]. In terms of seeking to set the right conditions for innovation, Avadikyan and 
Cohendet [58] state that the central and challenging issue faced by the buyer is effective gov‐
ernance mechanisms which can deal with the trade‐off between short‐term efficiency and 
the long‐term, relational aspect of knowledge economics. Furthermore, strategic knowledge 
management is a fundamental element of innovation processes with inter‐organisational 
arrangements such as networks, long‐term partnerships, communities and knowledge plat‐
forms recognised as important features. Long‐term, partnered PCP contracts in the defence 
industry are an example of evolving knowledge management networks with management 
practices aimed at collective learning and co‐construction of competencies between the 
public and private sector. Swart and Harvey [59] build on this idea suggesting that the key 
knowledge within projects exists across the boundaries between organisations, such as the 
customer‐supplier boundary, and that this area is one of the most fertile regions for innova‐
tion. Utilising a knowledge‐based view provides a mechanism for knowledge creation and 
structuring organisations or processes. Routines which encourage knowledge sharing and 
absorptive capacity are important to organisations that wish to be successful at innovating 
[16]. Ng and Nudurupati [47] suggest that, in the PCP context, sharing knowledge reduces 
uncertainty and unpredictability which would support innovation.
Incentives are a critical factor in supporting mechanisms for innovation in any context [60]. 
There is plenty of historical evidence of investigating methods to enhance innovation within 
defence contracts with Sumner [61] examining incentive mechanisms ‘apart from profits to induce 
innovation’ looking at ways of jointly engaging parties in government contracts. Link [62] sug‐
gests that public/private activity is part of the national innovation system as efficiencies from 
R&D can be leveraged. Thereby, PCP contracts can be a mechanism for supporting innovation 
where new technology is being developed for reliability improvement or capability upgrades.
Agency theory views ‘contracts’ as instruments for aligning incentives and sharing risks 
especially in the context of environmental uncertainty and lack of information [63, 64]. For 
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example, long‐term contracting within the defence sector has many uncertainty issues. On 
the supply side, there is technology obsolescence and on the demand side, variation in the 
employment of defence forces [65]. Selviaridis and Wynstra [54] conceptualised performance‐
based contracts along three key dimensions, as shown in Figure 1. Within a PCP contract, 
incentives are a fundamental aspect and the structure of financial and non‐financial incentives 
will, therefore, have a major impact on supplier behaviour. The package of financial rewards 
or penalties within the contract can encourage suppliers to innovate or create negative con‐
sequences, such as opportunism [66, 67]. Rather than traditional fixed‐cost or cost‐plus, PCP 
contracts utilise target cost, incentive fee contracts which provide a mechanism to share prof‐
its between the customer and the suppliers [8]. However, Behn and Kant [68] highlight that 
experimentation, innovation and continuous improvement will be inhibited if exceeding 
higher performance targets is not appropriately rewarded.
As manufacturing firms move to a servitisation approach, delivering value takes a different 
form with many of the activities performed by customers through the lifecycle of the product 
[40]. The supply chain relationships are ‘bi‐directional’ where customers also act as suppliers 
[69, 70]. Within the PCP context, this bi‐directionality of supply chains is emphasised with the 
customer having clear roles in achieving desired performance or co‐production of outcomes. 
Although this complicates service supply chain innovation, it also offers plenty of opportu‐
nity for innovation in design, or where capabilities should be placed or how value is delivered 
[35, 71]. It is particularly important that PCP contracts align the goals of the customer and 
the supplier through behavioural incentives. For instance, Ng et al., [45] and Caldwell and 
Howard [2] emphasise how the customer utilises the equipment over the life of the product 
and its impact on the way the supplier delivers the service.
Figure 1. Stylised model of PCP contracts (as presented in Selviaridis and Wynstra [54]).
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Kostas and Andreas [72] indicate that PCP studies stress that incentive systems should reflect 
a good balance of risks and rewards for customers and suppliers. As well as the alignment 
of goals with the customer, the prime contractor must also focus on the relationship with the 
extensive network of sub‐contractors. Opportunity for innovation exists within this network but 
as Spring and Araujo [73] indicate, sub‐contractors are not compliant bundles of supplementary 
resources, they are ‘innovating, multi‐product, ‘flesh‐and‐blood’ organisations’ (p. 154), in their own 
right. Sharing the cost of uncertainty, but also the rewards for innovation with sub‐suppliers, 
will potentially enable a prime contractor to achieve sustainable success on PCP contracts.
2.5. Timeframe, managing risk and the design of PCP contracts
The financial drivers for firms to move to service strategies are higher profit margins and 
stability of income [38, 40]. With the lifecycle of complex equipment, like fighter aircraft often 
being decades, the costs of support are approximately seven times the manufacturing costs 
[74, 77]. Regular income from PCP contracts is attractive to firms as it balances unfavourable 
economic cycles and the effects of mature markets [30, 75, 76]. For the customer, PCP contracts 
can elicit desired behaviours arising from the incentives within the contract, thus reducing the 
cost of contract and the more expensive through‐life costs of the equipment over the longer 
term. Over time, by understanding the use and outcomes required by the customer from com‐
plex equipment, firms are able to change business models shifting customer interaction from 
purely transactional (i.e. selling products) to a relationship basis [77].
Hooper [78] suggests that to make performance improvement focused investments, suppliers 
require incentives, which are often long‐term agreements which enable amortisation of the 
investment and profit for the firm [79], whereas Eldridge and Palmer [80] propose that short‐
term contracts do little to promote investment in innovation. As performance incentives need 
to be sustainable through‐life, Lane [81] also indicates that PCP contracts are not appropriate 
for a short timeframe. However, an optimum period exists for the length of the PCP contract 
or contract review. This is because it is difficult to judge, over time, how sustainable perfor‐
mance‐based incentives in long‐term contractual relationships are as supplier learning occurs 
and service improvements become marginal [54].
A key element of a PCP contract is the transfer of risk to the supplier as benefits are now tied 
to the achievement of performance outcomes [82]. Therefore, risk appetite and the process for 
managing risks through the contract are fundamental issues in contract design and manage‐
ment. The level of risk that a supplier will accept will be contingent on how comfortable the 
supplier feels and risk appetite may be low where the supplier perceives a lack of control or 
limited ability to manage the risk [47, 53]. Where customers are risk averse and are willing 
to transfer financial and operational risk to suppliers, then PCP contracts provide a suitable 
vehicle. Even with significant risk transfer in regulated sectors like defence, the buyer is still 
accountable for service failure [83]. The supplier's risk appetite can be a key limiter to success‐
ful PCP contracts and innovation within this context with some of the literature contending 
that a reticence from the supplier to accept risks related to service failures due to untested 
technologies or failed experimentation with working methodologies will inhibit innovation 
[53, 54, 78]. Therefore, risk management is key to successful innovation within a PCP contract.
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Theoretical propositions identified in the literature review Key contributions
Trends TP.1: In a limited market, PCP 
contracting may inhibit radical 
innovation capability.
Incremental innovation is a strategy for many firms but focusing purely on incremental 
innovation can harm firm performance in the long‐term. Firms which have an incremental 
or radical orientation will require quite different organisational capabilities which will be an 
issue for firms in limited markets involved in PCP contracts.
[2, 11, 19, 22]
TP.2: Innovation is driven by a co‐
evolution of the technologies and the 
institutions.
Industry dynamics are driven by the interactions between technology and institutions, and 
their interlocking elements and processes are a potential source of inertia or transformative 
pressure. Clear connections exist between innovation systems and the rest of the economy.
[25, 28, 29]
TP.3: Managing complex programmes 
in the servitisation context requires 
new capabilities and knowledge 
combinations.
Servitisation has become a key source of growth for many industries. Longer‐term 
relationships are emphasised with a shift towards organisational innovations, such as PCP 
contracts. Complex programmes require new interactions between the public and private 
sector which implies new knowledge combinations and capabilities between these parties. 
Organisational routines and process that support learning enable designers, integrators and 
suppliers of complex product systems to build capabilities based on previous activity.
[2, 29, 30–33]
Success 
factors
TP.4: A shared, strategic vision 
between customers and suppliers 
combined with a service‐based 
approach integrated across the whole 
enterprise supports innovation in PCP 
contracts.
In limited markets, close integration between customers and suppliers is inevitable. 
Innovation is supported by a shared strategic vision together with effective communication, 
collaboration and intimate knowledge of the customer's operations. A service‐based approach 
focused on outcomes provided by products and actions can be a strategy for innovation.
[35–38, 41, 42, 44, 
46, 47]
TP.5: PCP contracting can engender 
long term, proactive agent incremental 
innovation.
PCP contracting being outcome focussed with the customer only paying for delivered 
outcomes rather than activities and tasks implies changes to the established architecture of 
‘production’ and ‘manufacturing’ driving firms to be more innovative in the co‐creation of 
service value. PCP contracting supports innovation in the long‐term as suppliers may have an 
interest to invest in designing more reliable products or improved processes.
[37, 39, 48–52]
TP.6: Systems for knowledge sharing 
should be built into the enterprise.
Innovation, to a large extent, derives from the knowledge exchange between organisations. 
Key knowledge within projects exists across the boundaries between organisations, such as 
the customer‐supplier boundary, and this area is one of the most fertile regions for innovation.
[16, 47, 56–59]
TP.7: Appropriate incentive structures 
are key to promoting innovation in 
PCP contracts.
Incentives are a critical factor in supporting mechanisms for innovation. The package of 
financial rewards or penalties within a PCP contract can encourage suppliers to innovate or 
create negative consequences. PCP studies stress that incentive systems should reflect a good 
balance of risks and rewards for customers and all suppliers.
[8, 35, 40, 45, 60, 
62, 66, 67, 71]
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Theoretical propositions identified in the literature review Key contributions
Barriers TP.8: Short‐term contracts do not 
support innovation within the PCP 
context.
To deliver complex equipment programmes where through life‐costs are high, regular income 
for firms and cost reduction for the customer supports the PCP approach. Long‐term contracts 
provide a key incentive to promote innovation.
[30, 38, 40, 47, 54, 
79–81]
TP.9: Inappropriate risk management 
will inhibit innovation.
A key element of a PCP contract is the transfer of risk to the supplier with the process for 
managing risks being a fundamental issue in contract design and management. The supplier's 
risk appetite can be a key limiter to successful PCP contracts and innovation within this 
context.
[47, 54, 78, 82]
TP.10: Service‐design boundaries can 
inhibit innovation.
Success within PCP contracts begins with the design of the contract including definable, 
measurable outcomes, appropriate incentive structures and the right governance. Barriers to 
innovation could come from restricting the supplier's freedom to service design and a rigid 
specification may inhibit a supplier's willingness to bear risk and be innovative.
[8, 54, 84, 85, 
87–90, 99]
Table 1. Theoretical propositions grouped into trends, success factors and barriers to innovation within PCP contracts.
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In pursuing success within PCP contracts, the design of the contract provides the fundamen‐
tal building blocks, which are clearly definable, measurable outcomes, appropriate incen‐
tive structures as well as the right mix of contractual and relational governance mechanisms 
[54, 83, 85]. This idea is supported by Olsen et al., [86] who concluded that trust, authority 
and appropriate incentives are key factors, in governance of complex outsourcing contracts. 
Moreover, the contract must also be flexible as a rigid specification may inhibit a supplier's 
willingness to bear risk and be innovative [8, 87]. Contract design sets the conditions for inno‐
vation over the life of the contract and the types of governance mechanism will play a key part 
in enhancing or restricting success [88–90]. Barriers to innovation could come from restricting 
the supplier's freedom to service design. This is highlighted by Axelsson and Wynstra [91] 
who indicate that there is a link between contract specification methods and the design of 
incentives for supplier‐led innovation [54].
2.6. Summary of theoretical propositions for innovation within PCP contracts
The preceding literature review provided the foundations to arrive at a set of theoretical 
propositions, summarised in Table 1. These theoretical propositions are suggested in terms of 
trends, success factors and barriers to be used to analyse innovation within the context of PCP 
contracts in a limited, specialised markets. The following section will explore each of these 
propositions in the context of the case of the Typhoon project in Section 3.
3. The case of the defence industry and the Typhoon project
In this section, the UK defence industry and the Typhoon project are presented drawing on 
fourteen interviews with key personnel in three UK defence companies and the MoD. These 
individuals are involved in contracting for complex performance at the strategic, operational 
and commercial levels. Each of the theoretical propositions presented in Table 1, is reviewed 
in the context of the Typhoon project to offer some lessons learnt in the context of the case, 
before moving towards some guidelines that may be applicable to other practicing managers 
in this area.
3.1. UK defence industry
The defence industry is a specialised market with some unique characteristics that influence 
the business strategies adopted. Blom et al., [92] provide a number of factors, which explain 
the idiosyncrasies of the market: firm heterogeneity, stable structure, high innovativeness, 
high export propensity and active public involvement. Defence firms are highly heteroge‐
neous with a varied array of technical competencies and product portfolios operating in a 
stable oligopolistic market structure that has a low exit and entry rate. High innovativeness 
is a feature of most defence firms with respect to technological innovation with collabora‐
tion between private and public organisations being commonplace. Additionally, defence is 
a monolithic customer which will buy major equipment, like fighter aircraft, in batches or 
tranches from a single manufacturer under a prime contract that it will likely keep for up to 
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30 years or more [93]. The industry has a high export propensity with a large proportion of 
firms, which sell products; is of strategic importance from a military and national security 
perspective; it is heavily regulated and there is extensive, active public involvement with the 
public sector providing a key, stable source of income.
Maintaining defence capabilities is expensive with the UK committing £46Bn in 2016 which 
is 2% of GDP as required by NATO [94]. Governments have realised that it is unaffordable to 
have national capabilities in every area; therefore, governments have addressed the issue by 
reducing the costs of maintaining a domestic industry through privatisation, engaging in the 
export market which reduces unit cost through scale, and engaging collaboratively with other 
nations [92]. In turn, this explains why defence trade is a facet of national security strategy 
as it enables a balancing between spending and security. Figure 2 shows how the network 
functions.
Changes in the approach to procurement from the MOD, which began to apply a more com‐
mercial mind‐set as a result of the Levene reforms in the 1980s and, more recently, the Grey 
review [96], introduced competitive tendering processes as well as more stringent contracts 
which transferred risks for development, production and support of equipment from the 
MOD to industry. These reforms had a fundamental impact on the strategies for defence com‐
panies as traditional cost‐plus contracts were replaced by target‐cost, incentivised contracts 
together with a partnered approach to procurement.
3.2. The Typhoon programme
The Eurofighter Typhoon programme was established in the 1980s to design, develop, and 
support a new European fighter aircraft. Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain formally agreed to 
start development of the aircraft in 1988 under a complex, collaborative arrangement designed 
to share the huge costs of the programme with the UK eventually purchasing over 100+ air‐
craft in a number of staged buys or tranches. The European dimension created a  significant 
Figure 2. The defence industry and national security network (reproduced from PWC [95]).
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complexity within the organisation and design in addition to the complex nature of the tech‐
nology being developed and supported. Each partner nation was awarded a work share under 
the principle of juste retour1 with the aim of the programme to share work, technologies and 
develop national capabilities. Programme management is led by an agency, which represents 
the four countries, and the Eurofighter consortia provides the industrial construct represent‐
ing the prime contractors involved in the programme. A schematic of the programme man‐
agement is provided at Figure 3:
The differing requirements, influences, and aims of all the agencies all contribute to creating 
significant issues in managing the programme or striving to create an environment for inno‐
vation. In the case of Typhoon programme the decision‐making cycle is measured in years 
of the programme, neither weeks nor months. This creates issues in getting everyone har‐
monised around a particular course of action, particularly as many agencies are involved, in 
four partner nations and companies and two management agencies. Within the supply chain, 
there a host of other agenda's—physical, economic and industrial.
1Principle that the funding granted to project participants from a given country/region under a joint call is in proportion 
to the budget contributed to the joint call by that country/region.
Figure 3. Typhoon programme management construct (reproduced from MOD [97]).
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3.3. The UK support construct
The programme is designed to maintain alignment across all of the partner nations but per‐
missions are built into the construct to enable individual nations to develop the capability of 
their aircraft using different approaches especially in the support construct with an expecta‐
tion of potential convergence and reintegration at a later date. Over the last 10 years, this 
has enabled the UK to develop a service‐based, availability solution for the Typhoon air‐
craft support which will become truly outcome‐based with the latest iteration of the contract, 
the future state operating model (FSOM), worth £2.1Bn over 10 years, although the engine 
remains a separate availability contract.
An outcome‐based solution enables the MOD to address the key issue of affordability, reduce 
complexity and transfer risk to the provider [8]. Prior to availability contracting, Royal Air 
Force (RAF) personnel carried out maintenance and upgrade of aircraft in‐house with spares, 
equipment and technical support purchased from a range of contractors on a piecemeal basis 
by MOD staff; this model became unaffordable and did not exploit the capabilities of indus‐
try. Aligned with the governmental drive for more outsourcing under the MOD's SMART 
procurement initiatives [89, 96], moving to a service‐based, PCP contract enables a prime 
contractor to take on the responsibility for a defined output, such as available flying hours, 
in exchange for a fee [45]. Adopting this strategy provided industry the opportunity to reap 
the benefits of servitisation, such as higher profit margins, stability of income and protection 
from economic cycles [38, 40] at a period when the outlook for the number of large‐scale 
production programmes has reduced. The risks and rewards are co‐shared appropriately 
through the creation of painshare and gainshare mechanisms within the contract, which are 
common on one‐off, complicated programmes [8] with long‐term partnering relationships 
being emphasised between the MOD and industry.
For military aircraft, there is a requirement to constantly upgrade as new technology becomes 
available to defeat potential threats and contracting for availability (CFA), which first appeared 
in the mid‐90s, enables upgrades to be achieved at the point of routine servicing which keeps 
costs down and availability up. CFA is a form of PCP contract where equipment, such as air‐
craft, are made available for tasks normally measured in flying hours. There have been various 
CFA for combat aircraft including Tornado, Harrier and Typhoon. In addition to the UK, armed 
forces from across the globe are moving to this form of delivering defence capabilities [98].
Due to the political, organisational and technical complexities involved with the Typhoon 
programme, the steps towards an outcome‐based contract have been evolutionary. The first 
Typhoon availability service contract signed in 2009 was in reality four outputs: aircraft, 
spares, technical information and training rather than a single outcome: flying hours. Because 
the construct did not focus solely on the real value to the customer, which was flying hours, 
there were significant issues with the initial contract with apparently little co‐creation of ser‐
vice value [48] or collaboration and co‐ordination along the supply chain due to misalignment 
of incentives [36, 39, 49]. The issues are exemplified by a number of respondents:
‘That's what the output was, you then had the frontline squadrons integrating it and turning it into 
flying hours and we spent our lives fighting over moderation of why our aircraft were delivered late’.
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‘…because it was a claims culture, we had a room of people to work out where we were failing in our 
commitments so they could put a claim in. We had a room of people claiming against [Contractor X] 
lack of output performance and it was a battle…it definitely did not stimulate innovation. It might have 
stimulated innovation within our own organisations to win those battles but it did not actually stimu-
late innovation across the organisational boundaries’.
Over the last few years, the programme has been in the midst of re‐negotiation of a new 
contract, which is reaching culmination. The FSOM contract is structured so that the supplier 
effectively only gets paid for the number of hours flown by the customer. The catalyst for 
the new contract was a review which demonstrated that the funds to support the platform 
could potentially run out before the end of the programme. Neither the MOD nor industry 
could countenance the aircraft not being in service as the Typhoon provides a key defence 
capability which could not be replicated and being without UK Typhoons would seriously 
inhibit the potential for future export sales of the platform. The difficult question for the MOD 
is how to incentivise the suppliers, who are still heavily orientated towards a manufactur‐
ing/production culture, in the conditions that prevail within the oligopolistic market struc‐
ture of the defence industry [92, 93] to enter into a more challenging contract that potentially 
reduces further the revenues from support? A key element of the solution was the principle 
of ‘recycling’ savings from support into funding equipment capability (i.e. product) develop‐
ment programmes which would benefit industry by guaranteeing opportunity for revenue 
and providing work for engineers and benefit the customer by reducing support costs while 
generating more defence capability. By introducing the recycling principle, there is a better 
alignment of the goals of all parties within the enterprise, which has the potential to stimulate 
further innovation beyond what has already been baked into the contract [2, 45].
3.4. Review of key propositions in the case of the Typhoon programme
The theoretical propositions’ combining trends (discussed in Section 3.4.1), success factors (dis‐
cussed in Section 3.4.2) and barriers (discussed in section 3.4.3) to innovation within PCP con‐
tracts are discussed in relation to the Typhoon programme in this section. Lessons learnt are 
offered for the Typhoon programme that have implications for a set of guidelines that will be 
useful to the practising manager involved in PCP in the future, either as buyers or suppliers.
3.4.1. Innovation trends
3.4.1.1. Radical innovation capability (TP.1)
Innovation is about managing the process of turning uncertainty into knowledge. Incremental 
innovation, although not risk‐free, is a strategy focused on developing improvements from 
a position of some certainty whereas radical innovation involves starting at the limits of 
knowledge [4, 22]. In a limited market such as the defence industry, political constraints and 
government regulation, both nationally and internationally, and a lack of investment inhibit 
manufacturers going it alone on large‐scale or high‐risk programmes which reduces the pro‐
pensity for radical innovation. The ability to link advanced technologies to market opportu‐
nities is a crucial aspect of radical innovation. When markets do not yet exist, it is difficult to 
persevere when there are organisational pressures for immediate profit [20]. A respondent 
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commented that ‘regulation is great … as it provides government security but does limit the ability 
of anyone to invest in [the defence industry]’ and that the majority of the risk is jointly managed 
with the customer (The MoD). The respondent suggested that this hinders the ‘ability to gen-
erate dislocative technologies‘ that provide options to both the customer and business as such 
innovation is often determined by political will to support and sponsor. Safety assurance, 
governance and the size of market creates difficulties for innovation in this context which 
is risk averse compared to less constrained, consumer‐led markets, such as telecommuni‐
cations or information technology markets. Moreover, the time to market performance for 
technology or process development may be too great to match customer need. One of the 
respondents discussed how contracts can drive the type of innovation and can lock down 
the opportunity for radical innovation as PCP contracts tend to be structured around remov‐
ing cost through incremental innovation or optimisation. This suggests a need for a strategic 
focus by governments and firms on this issue, if the industry is to retain a radical innovation 
capability.
3.4.1.2. Co‐evolution of the technologies and the institutions (TP.2)
Governmental commitment to outsourcing on large programmes has driven innovation in 
the support market and the development of PCP contracts. As the support market is taking 
a more dominant or equal position, this is reshaping the strategies of firms. Additionally, the 
unique nature of the market and the linkages with national security strategies [92] drives the 
relationship between the organisations, public and private, within the industry. As the indus‐
try has tended towards a transnational growth strategy, the dynamics of the relationships are 
continually evolving with different models of support and more organisations influencing the 
environment [25]. This view was supported by respondent from a supplier who highlighted 
the change in nature of their business from ‘leading developing in Europe, to one that was a fol-
lower in the US’ noting that in 2007 they were 70% dependent on the ‘domestic customer’ and 
by 2017, 70% dependent on the export market. The challenges faced by the industry may 
require taking greater risk to match perceived market needs, such as investment decisions 
may need to be earlier in the technology readiness cycle. Aligned with the findings of Lazaric 
et al., [29], exploitation and development of dual‐use technology, ranging from drones to data 
analysis, between the defence and the commercial markets remains important with commer‐
cial technology now tending to lead defence technology development (e.g. data analysis and 
forecasting capability in financial technology industries that can be used to improve spares 
forecasts).
3.4.1.3. New capabilities and knowledge combinations for managing complex programmes in the 
servitisation context (TP.3)
Avoiding bespoke solutions where possible, spreading learning back and forth across sec‐
toral boundaries and leveraging the extensive technology base that already exists within 
defence companies as well as outwith potentially provides a fertile landscape for innovation. 
However, flexible contracts will be required to enable technology insertion and exploitation. 
The industry consolidated considerably following the end of the Cold War in the 1980s and 
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further market‐led consolidation is suggested in the future [99]. With high entry barriers and 
limited competition, the market could evolve through the consolidation of the UK support 
structure. Potentially, in a limited market, collaboration between some of the lead players 
could lead to better innovation by focusing on the value chain of the capabilities that each 
of the firms has to offer. Centres of excellence for particular equipment or technology‐types 
could lead to better solutions. Although this was not a common innovation strategy across the 
firms researched, some of the new relationships developed between firms for the FSOM con‐
tract are indicative of this approach. In this regard, a level of integration should not entirely 
shut down the competitive landscape to prevent SMEs or new entrants from entering the 
market in future. Further research could be focussed on the threats and opportunities from 
further consolidation of the sector.
To better manage complex, product‐service programmes within a limited market requires 
different capabilities [2, 96, 100], such as the ability to analyse enabling processes and lead 
change. Sophisticated, strategic, enterprise‐wide modelling tools and learning processes 
should be built into contracts to enable value to be co‐created between the parties [27, 29]. 
However, boundaries, regulatory, commercial or otherwise, across the organisation can cre‐
ate significant blockers. To enable models to be developed requires clean data which can be 
shared which was a challenge for the Typhoon programme and, although full enterprise‐wide 
modelling tools do not yet exist, models and frameworks have been developed which have 
supported the new contract development. To be truly focused on value generation, innova‐
tion needs to be encouraged from across the enterprise from other non‐traditional areas, such 
as commercial and finance not just R&D, engineering or production and in all phases of the 
lifecycle, as detailed by a number of respondents.
Routines and processes developed across the organisation that support learning enable 
designers, integrators and suppliers of complex product systems to build capabilities. For 
example, adjacent industries, such as space or rail for the aerospace industry, can also act as a 
source of innovation, providing routes to new ideas or markets. Measuring innovation is dif‐
ficult and can be stifling but benchmarks, internal or external, can provide a useful gauge of 
innovation to guard against being too self‐referenced. Dobni [101] suggests setting up innova‐
tion benchmarking within lifecycle management and design review as a method of develop‐
ing capability. Project learning enables repeatable solutions [2] to be developed which can be 
used by a range of different customers or markets.
3.4.2. Success factors for innovation
3.4.2.1. Shared strategic vision (TP.4)
A fully, service‐orientated organisation with an integrated approach supports innovation, but 
it is not easy to create this type of organisation for companies originating from a manufactur‐
ing or production background which is demonstrated in the case. Abandoning product‐cen‐
tric for customer‐centric structures can meet resistance for fear of changes to the structure, 
missing performance targets and lack of understanding of a service strategy. The transition 
to services does not necessarily ensure the expected high returns which has been referred to 
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as the ‘service paradox in manufacturing companies’ without overcoming organisational and 
cultural hurdles [30, 38]. A respondent representing a Senior Director of a supplier pointed 
out ‘Where I believe we have to be is a much more service orientated organisation, where I believe 
we are DNA‐locked into is a much more product orientated organisation’. Evidence from the case 
underpins the theory that integrating traditionally separate areas together with leadership to 
develop a service innovation culture and environment supports the business transformation 
[46]. It was also recommended by two respondents that creating a separate arm of a business 
can be an effective strategy.
Leadership is required to inculcate the service ethos across all areas of the business from the 
composition of the board to the servicing bays focused on co‐creating value with the customer 
to deliver an effective and efficient service [45]. Appointing an innovation or service support 
director together with investment in a distinct business unit identity are all visible statements 
of intent which can support the cultural change required. Other examples highlighted included 
not being afraid of failure or experimentation, creating the right environment, use of social 
media and writing innovation into job descriptions. However, cultural change takes time, as 
the behaviours are at both the conscious and unconscious level, and all of the organisations 
were still learning and adapting to the service culture. For effective innovation in a partnered, 
PCP context, the service‐based approach and culture will extend across the customer‐supplier 
boundary with an enterprise approach which should be underpinned by a shared, strategic 
vision. Setting a transparent, strategic vision between the customer and supplier is always going 
to be challenging as it involves attempting to align national security goals with the goals of pri‐
vate companies but is key for partnered innovation over the decade‐long horizon of PCP con‐
tracts to provide reference points. Co‐locating those who are designing, delivering or managing 
the service also positively develops the right culture; the integration between the customer and 
supplier organisations has already been extensive. Some firms have established service deliv‐
ery centres on RAF sites and others have formed joint teams separate from firm HQs.
Another key consideration in joint, collaborative working is appropriate protection of intel‐
lectual property (IP) [39] and the current MOD rules for IP applied in the PCP context could 
be stifling innovation. This was exemplified by a Commercial Director from one of the sup‐
pliers who indicated ’ … the way the contract is set up means that we would have to share all of our 
background intellectual property with all of those companies for the RAF to benefit’. Even though 
many of the boundaries have been eclipsed with the advent of PCP contracts in defence, 
a fully integrated, enterprise approach does not exist as yet with many silos either across 
the internal boundaries of firms, such as between production and support, or at the external 
boundaries of the partnered organisation, such as maintenance on the flying squadrons who 
deliver the output. In a complex organisational mix like the Typhoon programme, there are 
various cultures including the military culture of the RAF, the MOD procurement agency and 
the business units of the private companies. Strong cultures can be a positive, but can also 
inhibit innovation by potentially being blinkered to different delivery models for the same 
effect. A value‐based, service‐orientated approach taken across the enterprise could allow 
more innovation and create a more cost‐efficient or effective solution. The PCP contracts for 
export customers have different boundaries for similar outcomes and provide a contrasting 
view to current UK support models.
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3.4.2.2. Long term, proactive agent incremental innovation (TP.5)
PCP contracts support the development of innovative ways to reduce cost or improve deliv‐
ery led by the agent. Directly linking payment to outcomes which provide value to the cus‐
tomer, like delivery of flying hours for the Typhoon, creates collaboration along the supply 
chain through incentive alignment [50]. The conditions for innovation in the long‐term are 
created as suppliers have an interest to be more efficient in service delivery and make prod‐
ucts more reliable to increase profitability [51]. By moving away from traditional cost‐plus 
and fixed cost commercial models to a target cost, incentive‐fee (TCIF) model is innovative 
and provides a framework for further innovation (Figure 4) but, unlike traditional models, 
TCIF requires active management from organisations with the right capabilities.
Building in a continuous improvement approach through the development of the service cul‐
ture can enable innovation within a contract. As suggested in the literature, the challenges of 
obtaining supplier‐led innovation are evident [53, 54, 78] but the PCP framework can set the 
conditions. On the Typhoon programme, significant costs have been removed over the life 
of the current contract and there are many examples of continuous improvement including 
developing a lean learning academy to improve maintenance efficiency, improving structural 
health monitoring data to improve engine life, and reducing the repair‐loop times in the UK 
or Europe. However, the learning has taken place iteratively over successive generations of 
contracts with the next contract planned to drive out almost 40% of the cost.
Figure 4. TCIF contract illustration (reproduced from MOD [97]).
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3.4.2.3. Systems for knowledge sharing (TP.6)
Knowledge exchange between organisations is a key factor in innovation [56, 57]. Within part‐
nered programmes, shared data of the right quality is a key enabler to driving innovation. 
To understand how cost could be removed from PCP contracts required visibility across the 
partnered community of cost drivers which ‘open‐book’ accounting has gone some way to 
facilitating. However, in maintenance support contracts, much of the uncertainty comes from 
how equipment is being used, so getting usage data would provide focus to drive cost reduc‐
tion or other operational benefits (e.g. sharing data in real time would provide operational 
benefits over the long term). Setting up appropriate mechanisms for cross‐fertilisation of ideas 
across organisational boundaries can also stimulate innovation. With the development of the 
partnered approach, knowledge management networks have been set‐up, designed around 
collective learning and co‐construction of competencies between the public and private sector 
[58] which are evident in the Typhoon programme. Involving partners in early stages of prod‐
uct development lifecycle enables potential improvements in design from a supportability 
or operational perspective but this may involve overcoming difficulties, such as security or 
competitive rivalry. Due to a silo approach and cultural issues, the MOD has struggled with 
cross‐functional learning across domains and platforms with successful ideas from air not 
necessarily being transposed to the land or maritime domains or between the various air plat‐
form contracts. As Van Baalen et al., [102] suggest that frameworks and tools, such as innova‐
tion portals, are proven mechanisms for promoting innovation, providing novel methods for 
interaction, unblocking innovation ideas and unlocking latent talent within the organisation. 
Investing in an enterprise‐wide toolset could enhance innovation across the partnered com‐
munity. For instance, the Innovation Manager at a supplier indicated that over 60% of the 
winning ideas come from an area outside of where the challenge originated.
3.4.2.4. Incentive structures to promote innovation (TP.7)
Incentivisation is vital to promote innovation, with alignment of goals of the parties involved 
being a key aspect [55]. In availability contracting, the servicing of equipment and spares is 
secondary to the provision of the main outcome, which is flying hours for future state operat‐
ing model (FSOM). Previously, the incentives were wholly misaligned as contractors got paid 
to repair parts and equipment which had broken so more work meant greater revenues for 
the suppliers. Under the new model, industry is incentivised to provide reliable and capable 
equipment, reduce maintenance downtime, improve logistics support as well as provide 
available aircraft. With the latest contract, the link between outcome, flying hours, and the 
contract is absolute which truly aligns the goals of the user, the RAF, with the procurement 
agency, the DE&S, and the industry partners which should drive the behaviours necessary to 
co‐create value. Gainshare arrangements under the TCIF model enable both parties to reduce 
cost and mitigate risk‐providing industry appropriate profit margins which should not limit 
innovation. Moreover, in the latest contract the MOD has added further incentive by com‐
mitting to recycling costs saved in support into capability upgrades for the Typhoon aircraft 
which drives the right behaviours, delivers more defence capability as well as maintains the 
defence industrial base for potential exports. As one respondent noted FSOM is a model that 
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drives the right behaviours and highlighted that there is a perceived reward for innovation. 
This has implications for efficiency as well as better technology that satisfy customer needs. 
Driving sub‐contractor innovation in the supply chain is challenging for the prime contractors 
as volume remains a key driver lower down the chain and many suppliers are dependent on 
production rather than support. Less money but greater margins is an obvious incentive but 
different partnering arrangements or alignment between the various suppliers of the indus‐
trial base can provide new dimensions which has occurred within areas of the new contract.
3.4.3. Barriers to innovation
3.4.3.1. Short‐term contracts (P8)
Long‐term contracts support innovation by promoting investment, and enhancing partnered 
relationships in the development and support of large, complex programmes like Typhoon 
which have a lifecycle of up to 30 years. The steady, predictable revenue for industry from PCP 
contracts is attractive to firms as it balances unfavourable economic cycles and the effects of a 
mature market [30], enabling an adequate return on investment compared to potentially more 
lucrative returns elsewhere. Over the lifecycle of the programme, the customer will be able 
to significantly reduce support costs. Longer contracts create the conditions for industry and 
the joint enterprise to invest in strategic capabilities. Additionally, in complex programmes, 
many of the opportunities for innovation, such as equipment reliability modifications, require 
time to mature. An alternate view could be competition but in the context of PCP, competition 
may not drive innovation in the long term and could be an expensive method with more risk 
than the collaborative‐partnering model as the national scale of the market is probably insuffi‐
cient. The Strategic Director of a supplier had indicated that competition can drive short‐term 
benefit but may not be a sustainable position for delivering the capability in the long‐term.
An appropriately balanced approach to the overall length and the review points of PCP con‐
tracts is suggested as the best approach to support innovation enabling iterative learning 
through the life cycle of the programme. A long‐term approach is required to support invest‐
ment and develop learning but sustaining incentives for innovation over time becomes dif‐
ficult as improvements become marginal [54]. An empirical review of various PCP contracts 
to determine optimum length and review cycle to support innovation could be an avenue of 
further study. The transfer of risk to the supplier is a key feature of PCP contracts [82] but 
risk needs to be managed in the right place to enable innovation. Some firms are well placed 
to manage the level of risk required for the innovation expected of the supply chain by the 
customer in the new contract, with the right capabilities in place and a good understanding 
of what is required to deliver the right level of performance. Others do not have the same 
risk appetite either because the capabilities are not in place or the level of incentives that flow 
through the contract are perceived to be insufficient as indicated by a number of respondents.
3.4.3.2. Risk management (TP.9)
The corporate processes in place within both the customer and supplier regimes restrict 
nuanced risk management which inhibits innovation. A highly regulated environment, strict 
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approval systems, high‐levels of scrutiny rather than autonomy make for risk averse organ‐
isational structure which stifles innovation. Some of the processes appear to be still focused 
on a production mentality rather than the agility required for innovation in support services. 
The result is an erosion of risk transfer as the contract is developed which will potentially 
mean less innovation over the lifecycle. Risk management can be improved through better 
data from greater modelling capabilities, and by having people who have developed the con‐
fidence to manage risks through experience in the PCP context which suggests retention of 
capability, learning and employment across similar projects.
3.4.3.3. Service‐design boundaries (TP.10)
Governance mechanisms will play a key part in enhancing or restricting success in innova‐
tion for PCP contracts [90]. Bureaucracy during contract development and the service design 
phase introduces time or inertia implying a tension between an appropriate balance of assur‐
ance versus the freedom to innovate. Contract design sets the conditions for innovation over 
the lifecycle and barriers to innovation could come from restricting the supplier's freedom to 
service design [91]. The scope of the contract is potentially the limiting factor with clear silos 
in design remaining. These potentially prevent the enterprise‐wide, value driven approach 
and the current boundaries could be tested for opportunities, including further internation‐
alisation, such as placing repairs in non‐traditional locations outside of Europe or the US. 
However, organisational appetite may be limited by various factors ranging from revenue 
generation to IP issues so the incentives would have to match. The design start point will 
also impact the outcome and a ‘bottom‐up’ approach to contract design focused on removing 
cost from the current state may be a constraint rather than starting with top‐level principles 
which could broaden thinking and approach (i.e. outcomes focused on a shared vision with a 
understanding of marketing constraints and operating capabilities).
4. Conclusion: towards some guidelines for enhancing innovation in 
limited markets
This chapter has presented a literature review to identify a set of ten theoretical propositions 
that have been categorised into trends, success factors and barriers to innovation within PCP 
contracts. Further to this, each of the propositions have been reviewed in the context of the 
MoD Typhoon Programme in order to arrive at a set of lessons that can be learnt for managing 
a PCP project in the UK Defence Industry. These lessons learnt are shown in Table 2 below, 
it is intended that these lessons learnt will be useful to the practising manager managing PCP 
projects and that further work is necessary to arrive at a set of guidelines for enhancing inno‐
vation in limited markets.
The chapter is limited in terms of generalisability by offering a single case and focusing within 
the Defence Industry. However, it is argued that the Typhoon Programme is representative 
of a typical and complex case that will be of interest and relevance to the practising manager. 
This work is grounded in a strong conceptual base but further empirical work is required to 
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further refine, develop and validate a set of guidelines in different sectors to improve the gen‐
eralisability of the findings. It is intended that a set of guidelines can be incorporated into a 
process framework to guide a Capitalise Project Management (PCP) project manager through 
a large‐scale and inherently complex procurement programme. This chapter has also illus‐
trated the challenges of innovation within the PCP context which set to remain the dominant 
form of defence procurement strategy for the foreseeable future.
Author details
Shaun Gee1, Miles W. Weaver2* and Grant MacKerron2
*Address all correspondence to: m.weaver@napier.ac.uk
1 Royal Air Force (RAF), British Armed Forces, United Kingdom
2 Edinburgh Napier University Business School, Edinburgh, Scotland
References
[1] Prins, G. and Salisbury, R. Risk, threat and security – the case of the United Kingdom. 
Royal United Services Institute. 2008;153(1):22‐27.
Lessons learnt from the Typhoon case Supporting theoretical 
proposition
1 For effective innovation in a partnered context, the service‐based approach and 
culture should extend across the whole enterprise underpinned by a shared, 
strategic vision.
4
2 Building a continuous improvement approach linked to a service culture enables 
innovation within a contract and over successive generations of contracts through 
iterative learning.
10
3 Frameworks and tools for promoting innovation (e.g. such as an innovation portal) 
should be considered to encourage enterprise‐wide innovation.
1, 2, 7
4 Partnering arrangements within the supply chain should be examined to exploit 
different potentially innovative arrangements beyond traditional constructs.
4, 7, 8, 9, 10
5 A balanced approach should be applied to the length and review period of PCP 
contracts to support innovation through the lifecycle of the programme.
5, 8,
6 Investment is made in modelling capabilities and human capability should be 
retained within organisations so that learning can be exploited across similar 
projects.
6
7 The boundaries and scope of a PCP contract should be carefully considered 
within the service‐design phase and at contract review points to ensure that future 
opportunities for innovation can be exploited.
10
Table 2. Lessons learnt from reviewing the theoretical propositions in the context of the UK MoD Typhoon Programme.
Case Study of Innovative Projects - Successful Real Cases194
[2] Caldwell, N. and Howard, M.B. Contracting for complex performance in markets of 
few buyers and sellers: the case of military procurement. Special Issue: Procuring & 
Managing Complex Performance, International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management. 2014;34(2):270‐294. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM‐10‐2013‐0444
[3] Schumpter, J. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 3rd ed. New York: Harper and 
Row; 1950.
[4] Tidd, J. and Bessant, J.R. Managing innovation: Integrating technological, market and 
organizational change. 5th ed. Chichester: Wiley; 2013.
[5] Secretary of State for Defence. Defence Secretary’s speech to RUSI on the SDSR 2015 
[Internet]. 2015. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence‐
secretarys‐speech‐to‐rusi‐on‐the‐sdsr‐2015 [Accessed: 10 December 2015]
[6] Oliva, R. and Kallenberg, R. Managing the transition from products to services. 
International Journal of Service Industry Management. 2013;14(2):160‐172. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1108/09564230310474138
[7] Kim, S.H., Cohen, M.A., and Netessine, S. Performance contracting in after‐sales ser‐
vice supply chains. Management Science. 2007;53(12):1843‐1858. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0741
[8] Datta, P. and Roy, R. Incentive issues in performance‐based outsourcing contracts 
in the UK defence industry: a simulation study. Production Planning and Control. 
2013;24(4):359‐374. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2011.648488
[9] Drucker, P. Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles. 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Butterworth‐Heinemann; 2001.
[10] Myers, S. and Marquis, D.G. Successful Industrial Innovations: A Study of Factors 
Underlying Innovation in Selected Firms. Washington: National Science Foundation; 1969.
[11] Strecker, N. Innovation Strategy and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study of Publicly 
Listed Firms. Wiesbaden: Gabler; 2009.
[12] Cooper, R.G. Project new prod: factors in new product success. European Journal 
Marketing. 1980;14(5/6):277‐292.
[13] Van de Ven, A.H. and Poole, M.S. Methods for studying innovation development in the 
Minnesota innovation research program. Organization Science, 1990;1(3):313‐335.
[14] Rothwell, R. Towards the fifth‐generation innovation process. International Marketing 
Review. 1994;11(1):7‐31.
[15] Chesbrough, H. W. The era of open innovation. MIT Sloan Management Review. 2003; 
44(3):35‐41.
[16] Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning 
and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly. 1990;35(1):128‐150.
[17] Ahmed, P.K. Culture and climate for innovation. European Journal of Innovation Man‐
agement. 1998;1(1):30‐43.
Innovation in Limited Markets: Managing PCP Projects in the UK Defence Industry
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67543
195
[18] Nonaka, I. The knowledge‐creating company. Harvard Business Review, 1991;7:162‐171.
[19] Smith, P. and Reinertsen, D. Developing Products in Half the Time. New York: Van 
Nostrand Reinhold; 1991.
[20] O’Connor, G. and Veryzer, R. The nature of market visioning for technology‐based radi‐
cal innovation. The Journal of Product Innovation Management. 2001;18(4):231‐246.
[21] Tellis, G. and Golder, P. First to market, first to fail? Real causes of enduring market 
leadership. Sloan Management Review. 1996:37(2):65‐75.
[22] Henderson, R. and Clark, K. Architectural innovation: The reconfiguration of exist‐
ing product technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly. 1990;35(1):9‐30.
[23] Appelbaum, E. The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power. Journal of Econometrics. 
1982;19(2/3):287‐299.
[24] Venebles, A. The economic integration of oligopolistic markets. European Economic 
Review. 1990;34(4):753‐769.
[25] Reppy, J. Conceptualizing the Role of Defense Industries in National Systems of 
Innovation. In: Reppy, J. The Place of the Defense Industry in National Systems of 
Innovation. ed. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA: Peace Studies Program, 
Cornell University. 2000.
[26] Schrempf, B., Kaplan, D. and Schroeder, D. National, Regional, and Sectoral Systems of 
Innovation – An overview. Report for FP7 Project Progress. progressproject.eu. [Internet]. 
2013. Available from: https://www.progressproject.eu/wp‐content/uploads/2013/12/
Progress_D2.2_final.pdf [Accessed: 2016‐06‐20].
[27] James, A. D. The place of the UK defence industry in its national innovation system: 
co‐evolution of national, sectoral and technological systems. In: J. Reppy (Ed.). The Place 
of the Defence in National System of Innovation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
2000. pp. 96‐125.
[28] Dosi, G. and Nelson, R. Technical change and industrial dynamics as evolutionary 
processes In: Hall, B.H. and Rosenberg, N. Handbook of the economics of innovation. 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North‐Holland. 2010. pp. 151‐127.
[29] Lazaric, N., Mérindol, V., and Rochhia, S. Changes in the French defence innovation 
system: New roles and capabilities for the government agency for defence. Industry and 
Innovation. 2011;18(5):509‐530.
[30] Baines, T.S., Lightfoot, H.W., Benedettini, O. and Kay, J.M. The servitization of man‐
ufacturing: A review of literature and reflection of future challenges. Journal of 
Manufacturing Technology Management. 2009;20(5):547‐567.
[31] Gallego, J., Rubalcaba, L. and Hipp, C. Services and organisational innovation: The right 
mix for value creation. Management Decision. 2013;51(6):1117‐1134.
Case Study of Innovative Projects - Successful Real Cases196
[32] Prencipe, A. Technological capabilities and product evolutionary dynamics: A case 
study from the aero engine industry. Research Policy. 1997;25:1261‐1276.
[33] Hobday, M., Davies, A. and Prencipe, A. Systems integration: A core capability of the 
modern corporation. Industrial and Corporate Change. 2005;14(6):1109‐1143.
[34] Hensher, D. A., and Stanley, J. Performance‐based quality contracts in bus service provi‐
sion. Transportation Research Part a: Policy and Practice. 2003;37(6):519‐38.
[35] Guo, L. and Ng, I. The co‐production of equipment‐based services: An interpersonal 
approach. European Management Journal. 2011;29(1):43‐50.
[36] Randall, W. S., Nowick, D. and Hawkins, T. Explaining the effectiveness of perfor‐
mance based logistics: A quantitative investigation. International Journal of Logistics 
Management. 2011;22(3):324‐338.
[37] Backlund, S. and M. Eidenskog. Energy service collaborations—it is a question of trust. 
Energy Efficiency. 2013;6(3):511‐521.
[38] Gebauer, H. and Friedli, T. Behavioural implications of the transition process from prod‐
ucts to services. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing. 2005;20(2):70‐80.
[39] Melnyk, S. A., Davis, E.W, Spekman, R.E. and Sandor, J. Outcome‐driven supply chains. 
MIT Sloan Management Review. 2010;51(2):33‐38.
[40] Wise, R. and Baumgartner, P. Go downstream: the new profit imperative in manufactur‐
ing. Harvard Business Review. 1999;77:133‐41.
[41] Manzini, E. and Vezzoli, C. A strategic design approach to develop sustainable product 
service systems: Examples taken from the ‘environmentally friendly innovation’ Italian 
prize. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2003;11(8):851‐857.
[42] Tukker, A. and Tischner, U. Product‐services as a research field: Past, present and future. 
Reflections from a decade of research. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2006;14(17): 
1552‐1556.
[43] Vargo, S.L. and Lusch, R.F. Evolving to a new dominant logic for marketing. Journal of 
Marketing, 2004;68(1):1‐17.
[44] Lightfoot, H.W. and Gebauer, H. Exploring the alignment between service strategy and 
service innovation. Journal of Service Management. 2011;22(5):664‐683.
[45] Ng, I.C.L., Maul, R and Yip, N. Outcome‐based contracts as a driver for systems think‐
ing and service‐dominant logic in service science: Evidence from the defence industry. 
European Management Journal. 2009;27(6):377‐387.
[46] Neu, W. and Brown, S. Forming successful business‐to‐business services in goods‐domi‐
nant firms. Journal of Service Research. 2005;8(1):3‐17.
[47] Ng. I.C.L. and Nudurupati, S.S. Outcome‐based service contracts in the defence indus‐
try—mitigating the challenges. Journal of Service Management. 2010;21(5):656‐674.
Innovation in Limited Markets: Managing PCP Projects in the UK Defence Industry
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67543
197
[48] Bessant, J. and Davies, A. Managing service innovation. In: Bessant, J., Davies, A., Tether, 
B., Howells, J., Voss, C., Zomerdijk, L. and Massini, S. Innovation in Services. 2nd ed. 
Department of Trade and Industry, UK, 2007. pp. 61‐95.
[49] Tarakci, H., Tang, K., Moskowitz, H. and Plante, R. Maintenance outsourcing of a 
multi‐process manufacturing system with multiple contractors. IIE Transactions, 2006; 
38(1):67‐78.
[50] Randall, W.S., Pohlen, T.L. and Hanna, J.B. Evolving a theory of performance‐based 
logistics using insights from service dominant logic. Journal of Business Logistics. 
2010;31(2):35‐61.
[51] Martin, L. Making performance‐based contracting perform: What the federal government 
can learn from the state and local governments. In: Abramson, M.A. and Harris, R. (Eds). 
The procurement revolution. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc; 2003.
[52] Johnson, W. H. A. and Medcof, J.W. Motivating proactive subsidiary innovation: 
Agent‐based theory and socialization models in global R&D. Journal of International 
Management. 2007;13(4):472‐487.
[53] Gruneberg, S., Hughes, W. and Ancell, D. Risk under performance‐based contracting 
in the UK construction sector. Construction Management and Economics. 2007;25(7): 
691‐699.
[54] Selviaridis, K. and Wynstra, F. Performance‐based contracting: A literature review and 
future research directions. International Journal of Production Research. 2015;53(12): 
3505‐3540.
[55] Datta, P. and Roy, R. Operations strategy for the effective delivery of integrated industrial 
product‐service offerings: two exploratory defence industry case studies. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management. 2011;31(5):579‐603.
[56] Lundevall, B.A. User‐producer relationships: national systems of innovation and inter‐
nationalization. In: Foray, D and Freeman, C. (eds.) Technology and wealth of nations. 
London: Pinter; 1993.
[57] Nooteboom, B. Learning by interaction: Absorptive capacity, cognitive distance and 
governance. Journal of Management and Governance. 2000;4:69‐92.
[58] Avadikyan, A., and Cohendet, P. Between market forces and knowledge based motives: 
The governance of defence innovation in the UK. Journal of Technology Transfer, 
2009;34(5):490‐504.
[59] Swart, J. and Harvey, P. Identifying knowledge boundaries: The case of networked proj‐
ects. Journal of Knowledge Management, 2011;15(5):703‐721.
[60] Clancy, M. and Moschini, G. Incentives for Innovation: Patents, Prizes, and Research 
Contracts. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2013;35(2):206‐241.
[61] Sumner, M. Studies of defense contracting. Harvard Business Review. 1964;42(3):20‐184.
Case Study of Innovative Projects - Successful Real Cases198
[62] Link, A. Public/Private Partnerships Innovation Strategies and Policy Alternatives. 
Boston, MA: Springer US; 2006.
[63] Mitnick, B. M. Fiduciary Rationality and Public Policy: The Theory of Agency and Some 
Consequences. In: Proceedings of the American Political Science Association (APSA’73). 
New Orleans, LA; 1973.
[64] Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour. Agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976;3:305‐360.
[65] Parker, D. and Hartley, K. Transaction costs, relational contracting and public pri‐
vate partnerships: A case study of UK defence. Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management. 2003;9(3):97‐108.
[66] McDonald, R. and Roland, M. Pay for performance in primary care in England and 
California: Comparison of unintended consequences. Annals of Family Medicine. 
2009;7(2):121‐127.
[67] Maille, P. and Collins, A.R. An index approach to performance‐based payments for 
water quality. Journal of Environmental Management. 2012;99:27‐35.
[68] Behn, R. and Kant, P. Strategies for avoiding the pitfalls of performance contracting. 
Public Productivity and Management Review. 1999;22(4):470‐489.
[69] Sampson, S. E. Customer‐supplier duality and bidirectional supply chains in service 
organisations. International Journal of Service Industry Management. 2000;11(4):348‐364.
[70] Sampson, S. E., and Froehle, C.M. Foundations and implications of a proposed unified 
services theory. Production and Operations Management. 2006;15(2):329‐343.
[71] Sampson, S. and Spring, M. Customer roles in service supply chains and opportunities 
for innovation. Journal of Supply Chain Management. 2012:48(4):30‐50.
[72] Kostas, S. and Andreas, N. Performance‐based contracting in service supply chains: 
A service provider risk perspective. Supply Chain Management: An International 
Journal.2014;19(2):153‐172.
[73] Spring, M. and Araujo, L. Indirect capabilities and complex performance: Implications for 
procurement and operations strategy. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management. 2014;34(2):150‐173.
[74] Farris, M.T., Wittman, C.M. and Hasty, R. Aftermarket support and the supply chain. 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management. 2005;35(1):6‐19.
[75] Brax, S. A manufacturer becoming service provider—challenges and a paradox. 
Manufacturing Service Quality. 2005;5(2):142‐156.
[76] Malleret, V. Value creation through service offers. European Management Journal. 
2006;24(1):106‐116.
[77] Ng, I.C.L., Parry, G., McFarlane, D., Wild, P., Tasker, P. Complex Engineering Service 
Systems Concepts and Research (Decision engineering). London: Springer London; 2011.
Innovation in Limited Markets: Managing PCP Projects in the UK Defence Industry
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67543
199
[78] Hooper, L. Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the pay‐
ment model. Research in Transport Economics. 2008;22(1):57‐163.
[79] Hensher, D. A., and Stanley, J. Transacting under a performance‐based contract: The role 
of negotiation and competitive tendering. Transportation Research Part a: Policy and 
Practice. 2008;42(9):1143‐1151.
[80] Eldridge, C., and Palmer, N. Performance‐based payment: Some reflections on 
the discourse, evidence and unanswered questions. Health Policy and Planning. 
2009;24(3):160‐166.
[81] Lane, N. E. Performance incentives in the Massachusetts behavioral health program. 
Administration and Policy in Mental Health. 2005;32(4):387‐401.
[82] Nalli, G. A., Scanlon, D.P. and Libby, D. Developing a performance‐based incentive pro‐
gram for hospitals: A case study from Maine—this pilot program enabled hospitals and 
employers to meet their respective objectives regarding hospital performance. Health 
Affairs. 2007;26(3):817‐824.
[83] Doerr, K., Lewis, I. and Eaton, D. Measurement issues in performance‐based logistics. 
Journal of Public Procurement. 2005;5(2):164‐186.
[84] Bertone, M. P. and Meessen, P. Studying the link between institutions and health system 
performance: A framework and an illustration with the analysis of two performance‐
based financing schemes in Burundi. Health Policy and Planning. 2013;28(8):847‐857.
[85] Deng, Q. L., L. M. Zhang, Q. B. Cui, and X. L. Jiang. A simulation‐based decision model 
for designing contract period in building energy performance contracting. Building and 
Environment. 2014;71:71‐80.
[86] Olsen, B.E., Haugland, S.A, Karlsen, E. and Johan Husøy, G. Governance of com‐
plex procurements in the oil and gas industry. Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management. 2005;11(1):1‐13.
[87] Hall, M., Holt, R. and Graves, A. Private finance, public roads: Configuring the sup‐
ply chain in PFI highway construction. European Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management. 2000;6(3):227‐235.
[88] Lindkvist, L. Performance‐based compensation in health care—a Swedish experience. 
Financial Accountability and Management. 1996;12(2):89‐105.
[89] Jensen, P.H. and Stonecash, R.E. Incentive and the efficiency of public sector‐outsourc‐
ing contracts. Journal of Economic Surveys. 2005;19(5):767‐787.
[90] Lewis, M. A., and Roehrich, J.K. Contracts, relationships and integration: Towards 
a model of the procurement of complex performance. International Journal of 
Procurement Management. 2009;2(2):125‐142.
[91] Axelsson, B., and Wynstra, F. Buying Business Services. Chichester: Wiley; 2002.
Case Study of Innovative Projects - Successful Real Cases200
[92] Blom, M., Castellacci, F., and Fevolden, A. Defence firms facing liberalization: Innovation 
and export in an agent‐based model of the defence industry. Computational and 
Mathematical Organization Theory. 2014;20(4):430‐461.
[93] Ferguson, G., Ireland, V. and Elsey, B. (2012). “Product innovation success in the 
Australian defence industry: An exploratory study, Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, 
University of Adelaide.
[94] HM Treasury. Defence Spending 2016/17 [Internet]. 2016. Available from: http://www.
ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_defence_spending_30.html [Accessed: 2016‐07‐01]
[95] PWC. The defence industry in the 21st century [Internet]. 2005. Available from: https://
www.pwc.pl/en/publikacje/defence_industry_ads.pdf [Accessed: 2016‐07‐08].
[96] Gray, B. Review of acquisition for the secretary of state for defence. An Independent 
Report, October; 2009.
[97] MOD. Typhoon Future State Operating Model presentation. Unpublished. 2016.
[98] Gardener, C.P., Ogden, A.J., Kahler, M.H. and Brady, S. Balancing incentives and risks 
in performance‐based contracts. Defence ARJ. 2015;22(4):472‐506.
[99] Balis, C. Consolidation ahead: Europe's defence industry verges on a historic market‐
led transformation [Internet]. 2015. Available from: http://www.avascent.com/2015/02/
consolidation‐ahead‐europes‐defense‐industry‐verges‐on‐a‐historic‐market‐led‐trans‐
formation/ [Accessed: 2016‐07‐10].
[100] Haynes, D. Watchdog to investigate cost of U‐turn over navy jets. The Times. May 11, 
2012 p.12.
[101] Dobni, C.B. The innovation blueprint. Business Horizons. 2006;49(4):329‐339.
[102] Van Baalen, P., Bloemhof‐Ruwaard, J. and Van Heck, E. Knowledge sharing in an 
emerging network of practice: The role of a knowledge portal. European Management 
Journal, 2005;23(3):300‐314.
Innovation in Limited Markets: Managing PCP Projects in the UK Defence Industry
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67543
201

